



INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

TOPIC A: TRIAL OF OMAR AL BASHIR

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TOPIC B: Trial for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli

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International Criminal Court:

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DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMITTEE

The International Criminal Court is an international court categorized as permanent that has the leading function of trying, prosecuting, and investigating individuals for a series of crimes that are of top concern to the international community. Predominantly, crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity as a whole. The International Criminal Court, The seat of the ICC is located in The Hague, Netherlands. In The Hague there are other courts such as the International Court of Justice and the International Residual Mechanism. However, it is important to note that the ICC differs from these courts in terms of its framework and jurisdiction, which is based on the Rome Statute. 123 nations have ratified what is considered one of the most important treaties created by the international community and the respective jurisdiction of the ICC. In 1998 the treaty was created to serve as the guide for the court including its rules, procedure, and as mentioned previously jurisdiction. In

addition to this, it is of high importance to comprehend that the International Criminal Court is not an office nor agency of the United Nations. The ICC is considered an independent body that has an independent mission separate to the UN. Nonetheless, on October 4, 2004, both the court and the organization signed an agreement referring to their quote; “institutional relationship”.

TOPIC (A): TRIAL OF OMAR AL BASHIR

Omar Al Bashir served a presidency term in the Republic of Sudan for 26 years, ranging from 1993 until he was overthrown by civilian protests and a military coup April 11, 2019. The International Criminal Court carried out two arrest warrants that were both ignored and denied by the Sudanese government. Al Bashir was charged with several counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. His actions were called out several times by the international community, with the Security Council being one of the first.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Omar Al Bashir was born on January 7, 1944. He joined the army and studied in a military college in Cairo. This led him to earn an important role in the Sudanese army campaign when returning to Khartoum, Sudan’s capital. However, Al



Bashir was always against the government and in the middle of frustration with its way of ruling he led a coup in 1998 that eventually led him to become chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, which at the time led the country. However, when occupying this place Bashir didn't go into immediate military rule. The first actions he took as chairman involved Islamizing the nation (separating it further from the Christian south) and dissolving parliament, as well as banning political parties. In order to achieve this he worked closely with Hasan al-Turbai, a close ally and leader of the National Islamic Front.


In 1996 elections were held within Sudan where Al Bashir was officially confirmed and elected president. Following his election he signed a new constitution and dismissed the cabinet. He was also known for using a strategy called "Coup proofing" in order to protect himself from being overthrown, taking into account the long history of this within Sudan. Following this strategy he used military force to oust several leaders and partners he felt were a threat to him and his government including, for example, al-Turbai.

In addition, the Southern Sudan People's Liberation Army was a group originally created as a guerilla against the 1983 government of South Sudan. This rebel

group, and Al-Bashir's government, were in a period of war for some time. However, due to international pressure the Sudanese president had to agree to certain cease-fire agreements that didn't last long. This, due to the ongoing oil crisis that the north faced in 1998 and that propelled the fighting.

Darfur conflict:

In 2003 rebels launched an attack against Al-Bashir's government claiming it to neglect Sudan's western regions, and in general non-Arab members of the population. In order to combat these rebels Omar Al Bashir decided to call for the Arab militia, commonly known by their name "Janjaweed". The government armed the group and by doing this gave them full access to the use of weapons and territory. The now military led group launched a full scale attack on the civilians of Darfur preventing international aid from accessing the civilians. From 2004-2007 several cease fire agreements were set into place. Nonetheless, the fighting continued, leaving 2 million people displaced from their homes. In 2007 a joint peacekeeping mission that included the African Union and United Nations was authorized and by 2008 troops began to deploy in Sudanese territory to bring aid to the population.



Organized Armed Conflict by Regional Distribution, Sudan, 1997-2015 (Figure 3 - extracted from ACLED)

During the year 2018 and following into 2019 Al-Bashir had to face a series of large scale organized marches against his government. The Sudanese citizens began marching, stating they wanted a democratic government and Bashir to step down. In spite of this, Al Bashir took several steps in order to minimize the protests. However, these just kept growing all the way up to April 2019 where the largest protest happened on the 6th. During this day thousands of protestors gathered in Sudan's capital and demanded for the president to step down. In response to these protests, and considering the long history of coups within the nation, the military and security forces that once protected Al-Nashir's life were now against him. A military coup took place, led by the RSF (Janjaweed/Rapid Support Forces) and the SAF on April 11, 2019, just 5 days after the largest protest took place. Omar Al-Bashir was immediately

arrested and held in the capital in jail for charges of corruption.

CAUSES

Despite the events that unfolded within the Darfur region the Security Council decided to take action. On March 31, 2005 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1593:

1. "Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;". (ICC-CPI, 2005)

Following this clause, the resolution makes clear its purpose to refer the situation in Darfur and Omar Al-Bashir, directly to the International Criminal Court. This would apply considering Article 75 of the Rome Statute, which, as mentioned previously, holds the jurisdiction of the court.

Following these events and the resolution that is created, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court decides to open an investigation in June of that same year, with the purpose of not only investigating Omar Al-Bashir but the events that unfolded in Darfur as well.

In addition to this, it is important to note that the Republic of Sudan did not ratify the Rome Statute, therefore, the state has no obligation to comply with the court. However, it is a member of the UN which subsequently means it must comply with all

Security Council resolutions presented. In this case, that resolution refers to the ICC, meaning the nation must comply.

Considering this, the court establishes 4 warrants of arrest set out and 3 summons to appear within the year of 2005 to bring to justice 4 perpetrators in the conflict including Al-Bashir. One of the characteristics of the court is it doesn't count with a military team or organization to bring the summons to court. Therefore, it relies solely and heavily on the cooperation of the states and the actors involved.


Omar Al-Bashir's first arrest warrant was set out on the: "4th of March 2009 and lists 5 counts of crime against humanity and 2 counts of war crimes." (*IntCriminalCourt, 2010*) Afterwards July 12, 2010 a second arrest warrant was issued for charges of genocide on the ethnic groups: Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa all from Darfur, that were also pastoralists.

REPERCUSSIONS

Al Bashir's 26 year term and the events that unfolded within Darfur created a wide discussion within the international community and the court itself. The UN published, from 2003, several statistics stating the repercussions that the attack of the Jambaweed had on the population of Darfur.

In February 2005 the UN released some of the first statistics: "1.85 million others are internally displaced or have fled to neighboring Chad since rebels took up arms in early 2003." (*UN Commission Finds Sudanese Government Responsible for Crimes in Darfur, 2005*) Later on, though, another statement was released with clearer estimates that said over 2.7 million members of the population remained internally displaced. (*Astoundz, 2023*) The UN created a commission dedicated to the investigation of the events unfolded, and to prove whether or not a genocide had been committed. Within the original report of the commission statistics of the deceased weren't clear as the report stated quote: "Tens of thousands of people have been killed." However, in statistics later released, it is estimated that around 400,000 members of the Darfur ethnic groups died either during or after the attacks.

Total Deaths and Excess Deaths* in Darfur and the Chad Refugee Camps
High and Low Estimates, March 2003 - January 2005
* Deaths owing to violence, disease, and malnutrition attributable to the conflict.





Total deaths an excess deaths in Darfur and the Chad refugee camps, high and low estimates, March 2003 - January 2005 (extracted from US Department of State)*

In 2013 the United Nations Human Rights: office of the High Commissioner published a public report titled: “Human rights situation in Darfur.” Within this report in depth details and statistics were given of the situation in Darfur that followed the original 2003 attacks. “In 2013 there were 380,000 newly displaced persons, the highest annual number of IDPs recorded since the conflict erupted in 2003.” (*Human Rights Situation in Darfur, Page 8, 2013*)

In addition, the amount of humanitarian assistance that was required in Darfur was extremely large. In 2007 there were 35,000 aid workers focused on providing for the community by granting them the basic resources needed. However, by 2013 the number of workers and volunteers significantly declined with only 6,850 in late November.

CURRENT SITUATION

The last reports published on Omar Al-Bashir were between April 25-26 2023. They narrate an attack that was held within the prison in Khartoum where he was being kept. The Kober prison apparently came under attack after the Rapid Support Forces

(RSF) and the army began fighting, reaching the prison, and eventually leading to a massive jailbreak. Several senior officials and members of Al-Bashir’s government escaped, leaving doubt within the millions of affected citizens the regime left behind.

Al-Bashir along with another group of prisoners were moved from the prison to the military hospital where they are being kept. Omar Al-Bashir has been kept in Kober for over 4 years, whilst authorities continue to deny his acts and refuse to hand him over to the International Criminal Court. The Sudanese population, specifically in the South, has continued pleading with authorities that they hand him over. However, considering the governmental and economic state that the crisis is in, the authorities haven’t considered handing him, or the other members of the government who are convicted, over.

Taking into consideration once again that the ICC relies fully on the support of other nations and the actors involved, there is doubt on whether the authorities will ever get to Bashir. Despite this, there have been several conspiracies stating that if Al-Bashir can’t go to court will come to him. Even though newspaper reports and articles have spoken of this, the UN and the International Criminal Court haven’t made a clear statement and as of right now they continue



to ask the authorities to hand the ex-president over.

ORIENTATION AND OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMITTEE

The court will have the main objective of finalizing the trial of Omar Al-Bashir and generating a ruling within the court that responds to the charges Al-Bashir faces, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. The ruling will be decided depending on the arguments that are presented. These are expected to not only be truthful and derive from reliable sources, but also arguments that represent the perspective and role of each side. The points will then be argued during the debates through opening statements and evidence. The goal will be for each side to defend their evidence and point of view, for their verdict to be favorable to their interests. All delegates are expected to have viable arguments and information that supports and is mainly relevant to the debate. A profound investigation will lead to better movement within the committee, and the facts presented will all serve toward the final verdict of the trial.

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GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. Does your delegation consider that the charges being held against Omar

Al-Bashir are fair taking into account it wasn't only him but a whole government system that were behind the acts committed?

2. Has your delegation given any previous statements supporting or being opposed to Omar Al-Bashir's actions? If so, what are the reasons behind that position?
3. To what extent does your delegation consider relevant the 2003 attacks in Darfur and what were the true repercussions these had within the country as a whole?
4. Does your delegation consider there is a lack of support from the Security Council and the UN during the process of getting convicted persons to court?
5. How much and what kind of evidence does your delegation hold either in favor or against Omar Al-Bashir's actions? Is there any justification?
6. Are there any other legal processes that your delegation considers more pertinent than the ones being held by the International Criminal Court right now?

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TOPIC (B): Trial for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli

Individuals such as Mahmoud Al-Werfalli have been part of the Libyan conflict that

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Vox. (2023, May 26). Sudan's conflict, explained [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IDfhxMwoyWo>

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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

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has lasted more than 12 years, beginning in 2011. Al-Werfalli was first imposed with an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court in August of 2017 and a second in July of 2018 related to charges of murder as a war crime. The court remained active on the case, however, Al-Werfalli



never communicated or turned himself in to the court.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Born in 1978 in Ajdabiya, Libya, Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli was the lieutenant and commander of the Al-Saiqua Brigade otherwise known as the “Libyan Special Forces”. Al-Werfalli began his role as commander during the 2011 uprising in Libya against 40 year ruler Muammer al-Qaddafi. The uprising began on February 15 following the beginning of the Arab Spring in the previous year.

Arab Spring

The Arab Spring was the largest pro-democracy wave to hit the Middle East and African nations, following years of dictatorships in many nations. Citizens began protests in December 2010, and these continued throughout 2011 causing several coups and various governments to topple under citizen and international pressure. Some of the main locations where protests were seen included: Libya, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, and North Africa. The entrenched movement led to civil wars in countries like Yemen and Syria, while in others such as Tunisia led to a change through a government and hope for a future led by justice. The uprisings that took place left an undeniable mark in the history of the Middle East and the African continent. It changed the economic, social, and political outlooks of many nations around the globe and their resources regarding each outlook.

The Libyan Special Forces (LSF) defected from Libya’s military before the Arab Spring movement began, leading them to be directly opposed to the government at the time. As mentioned previously, Al-Werfalli was a lieutenant. A position such as this one gained him the trust of the leaders of the forces and gave him the privilege to take control of various “teams” within the forces. He had access to weaponry, stationary teams, and the planning of the forces every move.

On February 15, 2011 in Benghazi, where the LSF is based, protesters gathered in rallies being upset regarding the “arrest of a human rights lawyer, Fethi Tarbel.” (*Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2023*) The protestors asked al-Quaddafi to release prisoners that defended certain politics opposed to his viewing and to step down from power after being in it for nearly 4 decades. In an attempt to calm the protests, Qaddafi streamed a pro-government rally on state television. However, the stream didn’t serve much use to the governor since the protests only continued intensifying and lethal force began being used against civilians.

After months of fighting and protests Qaddafi was forced from power and stepped down. Following this he was in hiding until October 20 when he was found by rebel armies and assassinated. However, after his death the Libyan nation was left in an unstable political and economical situation. This is due to the fact that the dictator used a divide and rule system. This system was based on eliminating political or military opponents that could gain

relevance and possibly attempt a coup on him and his government.


international attention immediately because of the beliefs each defended.

Because of this system many tribes and militias were left off the radar and took advantage of the Arab Spring protests to come together and attack Qaddafi. This included the LSF and Al-Werfalli's participation. Despite this, it was these same groups who turned on each other in the wake of a spot for power and began fighting for the leadership of the country.

On one hand, is the "Libyan National Army" (LNA) which is based on national militarism. This administration is based in the city of Tobruk in the east. The leader holds very important international allies, such as: Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt. It is against the "Muslim Brotherhood". Islam groups that are considered by many nations as groups outside the law. It is led by General Khalifa Haftar, and is based on a more national focus and future for the Libyan people.

After 3 years of fighting for power, 2014 was the year of parliamentary elections. These were held with help from the international community to stabilize Libya and fight for a democratic future. In spite of these elections though, several armed groups disagreed with the idea of holding them and instead decided to attack law enforcement and civil institutions as a form of protest.

On the other hand, the Government of National accord otherwise known as GNA. This governmental administration has been recognized by the UN and follows the quote "political islam" field. The administration is based in the capital of Libya Tripoli, and the prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj is the leader. Their international allies are Qatar and Turkey and, in contrast to the LNA, the administration is in favor of the "Muslim Brotherhood".



Age breakdown for deaths, injured and IDPs since the start of conflict. Libya 2011. (Figure 4 - extracted from Science direct)

In 2019 Egyptian, UAE, and Russian governments provided Haftar with arm supplies in order to attempt an invasion on Tripoli. This invasion had the purpose of not only having power on the east of Libya but also gaining what remained of the west.

Following these attacks two key players within the political future of Libya arose, and have attempted to gain power ever since. Both forms of government caught


After signing economic ties and accords regarding the Mediterranean sea, Turkey provided aid through military support to Tripoli and the GNA government in order to

defend themselves against Haftar and his army.

resolution the court began conducting investigations.

Civilians killed by airstrikes in Libya

Estimates show the number of civilian deaths spiked in the middle of last year.



*Civilians killed by airstrikes in Libya 2013-2020
(extracted from the Washington Post)*

The two groups continued fighting and trying to seize control of southern-west, and central parts of Libyan territory. Even though the government in Tripoli was able to drive out the LNA's troops they still weren't able to gain control of the central areas of Libya.

CAUSES

On February 16, 2011 the Security Council of the United Nations delivered Resolution 1970. The resolution included a section titled "ICC Referral" which stated the following: "4. Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;". (*United Nations Security Council, 2011*) Knowing that Libya is not a state party of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the court states they cannot trial individuals from the nation and within its territory. However, following the resolution set the ICC was able to open an investigation in Libya. Following this

"The Chamber bases its findings on an analysis of the evidence supporting the Application, which includes, in particular (i) recordings of witness interviews and summaries of witness interviews; (ii) video material and transcripts of video material; (iii) internal orders, and social media posts by the Media Centre of the Al-Saiqa Brigade; and (iv) reports of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and research centres." (*International Criminal Court, 2017*). Based on the evidence the chamber provided, the court decided to issue the first warrant of arrest charging murder as a war crime. Al-Werfalli participated in seven rounds of executions that involved 33 persons throughout 2016-2017. The incidents mentioned were the following:

Incident one

Video footage published on Facebook on June 3, 2016, shows Mahmoud Al-Werfalli in camouflage clothes near an unidentified person who is moving through the area with his hands in the air. Al-Werfalli is heard in the video asking the person to put his hands up. Afterwards he shoots the individual until they fall to the ground. He approaches the body and continues shooting.

Incident two

This time the video footage was posted on March 20, 2017. In the video, Al-Werfalli shoots 3 men who are kneeling in front of a wall, their hands tied behind their back.



Al-Werfalli shoots each a second time repeatedly once the bodies are on the floor.

Incident three

On the 7th and 8th of May, 2017 another video was published to social media. Al-Werfalli carries a weapon, and is in a room with people standing near a barefoot man. The unidentified man is kneeling and has his hands behind his head. The people that are in the room cheer when Al-Werfalli shoots the victim in the head.

Incident four

The 22nd of May 2017, more evidence was published. Al-Werfalli is accompanied by 2 other men that have their faces covered. The 3 men have weapons and are standing near 2 others kneel barefoot on the ground. They are detained in a cage. Al-Werfalli lets the 2 other men get near the cage while he walks away. He then makes a gesture with his left hand ordering the both to execute the individuals in the cage.

Incident five

The 9th of June of 2017, Al-Werfalli appeared in social media again. He is accompanied by 5 other men who have firearms. They are seen standing behind 4 other barefoot men who are kneeling on the floor. Werfalli makes a gesture with his hand that lets the armed men know that they can execute the other 4 men.

Incident six

10 days after the fifth incident, the six arose in social media. In a desert area, 2 individuals are kneeling on the floor with their hands behind their back. 2 other persons have firearms. This time Al-Werfalli looks at the camera when making the same gesture he usually does indicating execution. The men obey the gesture and execute both individuals.

Incident seven

Finally, the last incident is presented. Al-Werfalli starts reading a document that he calls a "Decree decision" which states that the persons that are going to be executed should be murdered the 17th of July, 2017. In the video 18 persons barefoot and wearing an orange jumpsuit are seen. Al-Werfalli points out the first group and 5 individuals shoot them. This action is repeated with every group until they are all deceased.

All the information regarding the incidents comes from the report published by the International Criminal Court declaring the first warrant of arrest (the document with extra details on each incident can be found in "guiding sources").

The first of August, 2017 he was contacted by the court. However, he never gave a response.

After the courts warrant on January 24th, 2018, videos shared on social media claim to show Al-Werfalli executing 10 blindfolded individuals who wore blue jumpsuits, kneeling in front of Baiha Radwan Mosque in Benghazi. The men had their hands tied



behind their backs and were positioned in a line. Further details in the videos allegedly show Al-Werfalli shooting each man in the head, one by one.

Following Al-Werfalli's actions the court considered the events unfolded as an eighth executing incident and issued a second warrant on July 4, 2018 based on the commission of murder as a war crime. This was due to Al-Werfalli not responding to the previous warrant established, and allegedly committing one more incident. This warrant was issued publicly so that any international organization or state could collaborate with its execution.

After the establishment of both arrest warrants and despite the court's constant efforts to find Mahmoud Al-Werfalli, he never responded to either of the warrants issued and there was a lack of support due to the political instability of the government.

REPERCUSSIONS

The civil conflict in Libya was not only fought on Libyan soil but was a concern for the entire international community. As mentioned in the historical context both administrations that are fighting for the leadership of the nation hold a series of important international allies that have been directly and/or indirectly affected by the internal conflict. In fact, many of the reasons behind these alliances have to do with benefiting from resources or precautions taking into account the security breaches within the country.

When analyzing the "Libyan National Alliance's" (LNA) allies there are countries such as Egypt that have been very adamant on their support. The reason behind this has been connected with the border that the nation shares with Libya. 1,115 km of border has constantly worried the Egyptian government. This has to do with extremist attacks and conflict entering the territory through the large, and hard to protect border. The government considers Haftar, leader of the LNA, to be the best option in preventing the spilling of these attacks and subsequently maintaining the peace on Egyptian soil.

The "Muslim Brotherhood" is another of the key topics that have been discussed between the supporters of the administrations. The Muslim Brotherhood, born during the 1920's in the republic of Egypt, was a movement that rallied against the modernist European way of rule and military dictatorships. The movement sought to promote a pan Islamic ideology and highlight its importance when governing a nation. However, over the years many countries have seen it as an opposition to governments and have tried to wipe out their relevance.

Taking this into account, it is important to understand that the LNA is against the Muslim Brotherhood and considers it an outlaw group. In 2014: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria and Russia, declared the brotherhood an outlaw group as well. This has been key in the countries alliances with the administration, being one of the main reasons as to why



these nations support the LNA, and find that having Haftar in control will only drive the brotherhood farther out of government in various Arab states and the world.

On the contrary, the UN recognized “Government of National Accord” (GNA) are in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood and don’t consider them as an outlaw group, but rather as legitimate, with political values and goals. This has led certain Arab nations to be further opposed to the administration. Yet, it has also attracted others such as Turkey and Qatar that have supported the brotherhood in the past. Even under intense international pressure to say otherwise.

Aside from the political division that opinions on the Muslim Brotherhood have sparked, Libya’s oil has been another target for the international community.

As of January 2023 countries such as Italy have begun signing deals regarding oil and energy with Libya. On January 28th of last year: “Italian energy company Eni and Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed an \$8bn gas production deal-” (*Aljazeera, 2023*) Despite the political instability of the Libyan region this deal was signed taking advantage of Libya's oil resources. After all, the country houses Africa’s biggest oil reserves.

Countries such as Turkey know the importance of supporting the GNA specifically in their deals for exploration in water. The Turkey and Greece and Cyprus

conflict over exploration in Turkish waters has lasted a few years now creating tensions between both nations. However, the Turkish government along with Libya’s current “Government of National Accord”, supported by the GNA, signed a memorandum. This, with the purpose of permitting exploration of Libyan waters and soil utilizing both Turkish as well as Libyan companies.

All of the events that have unfolded in regards to countries outside of the conflict have led many international members to question the help and attention being provided in Libya. This directly correlates with cases such as Al-Werfalli, who never responded to the court and was never sought out by other nations.

CURRENT SITUATION

After the second warrant of arrest was issued in 2017 the court maintained their previous requests for cooperation such as the first which was published in August 2017 following the first arrest warrant. “Request to Libya for cooperation in the arrest and surrender of MAHMOUD MUSTAFA BUSAYF AL-WERFALLI”. (*International Criminal Court, 2017*) Pre-trial judges have the key role of issuing arrest warrants and making sure there is enough evidence and reliable content to take the accused to trial. For this reason, after each arrest warrant the court assigns judges to their specific division and chamber as well as electing the presiding judge of the case.

In March 2021, 3 years after the second warrant was established the court published



the decision and assigned judges. On March 23, the “Decision on the Election of the Presiding Judge” was made. Here the nation of Libya, and any case attached to it would be part of Pre-Trial Chamber I and; “On 18 March 2021, the Judges of the Chamber elected Judge Péter Kovács to act as the Presiding Judge of the Chamber with immediate effect.” (*International Criminal Court, 2021*)

Following the Libyan nation, as of October 2021 the LNA and the GNA signed a permanent ceasefire agreement. This agreement led to a “government of national unity” to be established in order to govern and lead the nation. The International Criminal Court and the international community are still closely analyzing the case in Libya, and investigations are being held out on various individuals with the purpose of finding sufficient evidence for future cases.

ORIENTATION AND OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMITTEE

It is important to note that the assassination and death of Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli will not be taken into account within this committee with the purpose of going through with the trial. Meaning that any pieces of information and evidence related to/regarding the death of the accused will not be considered as valid within the court. The goal and objective will be the same as the one established in the previous topic. Members of the court must finalize the trial of Mahmoud Mustafa

Busayf Al-Werfalli and generate a ruling that is based on credible as well as reliable evidence. The court will respond to the charges of direct commission and committing of murder as a war crime and come to a final verdict. (*Al-Werfalli, n.d*)

GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. Has your delegation given any previous statements supporting or being opposed to Al-Werfalli’s actions? If so, what are the reasons behind that position?
2. Taking into consideration the current situation in Libya, does your delegation consider it truly urgent to place charges on individuals like Al-Werfalli?
3. What evidence has been gathered by your delegation or other sources that proves your perspective regarding Al-Werfalli’s actions?
4. What consequences should Al-Werfalli face considering the evidence found? Should the consequence include arrest, fines, etc.?

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